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Abstract
In this essay, I intend to elucidate Thomas Nagel’s radical concept of moral luck and 
the unnerving philosophical paradox that it inevitably arises when it is stripped to its 
essence: in pursuit of a method of fair moral assessment, we approach the possibility that 
nothing and no one can be aptly judged on moral grounds. I analyze some refutations to 
this troubling paradox, including Susan Wolf’s promising rejection of the subcategory 
of these refutations and Nagel’s and Bernard Williams’ musings on moral luck, I aim 
to propose courses of action that can lead to a functional society despite the paradox 
entailing the idea that humanity has no place for accurate moral judgment. In doing so, 
I suggest that moral luck must, to an extent, be ignored, and that a practical approach 
to humanity would continue to make moral judgments despite being threatened with 
Nagel’s sound declaration that this behavior is not logical. 
Paper
uncovering fascinating, yet deeply unsettling aspects of our moral composition and 
judgments. The reason why the results of such hallmark psychological experiments as 
no evil in their character. Though these unanticipated results have inspired a whirlwind 
of doubt surrounding the status of human agency, morality, and character, it is the 
perhaps venture most into troubling territory. Moral luck, coined by Bernard Williams 
(1976, 1981), occurs when one does not account for the factors beyond an actor’s control 
in condemning or praising the actor for their actions. In this essay, I seek to outline 
Nagel’s account of moral luck and the distressing paradox that it entails when taken 
to its logical conclusion. I will then examine and challenge the works of those who 
reject Nagel’s account, the most robust and intriguing being Susan Wolf’s 
Moral Luck (2001), and discuss the philosophical implications of and practical response 
At the crux of Nagel’s evaluation of moral luck is his distinction between four types of 
luck subject to moral assessment: constitutive luck (luck in one’s genetics, inclinations, 
etc.), circumstantial luck (luck in the situations one faces), luck based on antecedent 
circumstances, and luck in the consequences or results of the action(s) in question 
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(consequential luck) (Nagel 1979, 1). As the paradigmatic example explains, though it 
seems intuitive that the drunk driver who does not happen to be driving in the path of 
a child crossing the street should still be held equally morally accountable as the equally 
drunk driver who does drive in this child’s path and strikes him, we tend to hold the 
latter more accountable. The tug-of-war here between the intuition and the descriptive 
evaluation of the situation that we see in real life is the heart of the issue of moral luck. 
It seems that any conscientious philosopher would agree with Nagel and intuition 
the problem arises once we take moral luck to its logical conclusion, and approach the 
dangerous notion that no one can ever be held morally accountable for any action. As 
Williams (1981) asserts, making morality immune to luck may be an unattainable goal, 
of control is consistently applied, it threatens to erode most of the moral assessments 
pessimism appears to be an appropriate response.
The interactions between Nagel’s proposed subcategories of moral luck make the 
paradox of moral luck. To return to the example, if we hold that it is the act of driving 
drunk itself that is the morally reprehensible act, regardless of this action’s consequence, 
then we ignore the constitutive and circumstantial luck that lie at the heart of one’s 
decision to drive impaired. It cannot be true that the man who drives drunk and the 
by luck. 
So, if we subscribe to ignoring moral luck in making moral evaluations, then it seems 
even in cases like these that psychologically appear to be deserving of punishment on a 
adhere to ignoring factors outside of an agent’s control in making moral judgments, 
then we may not be able to make any moral assessments whatsoever. One could not 
claim that the serial killer is more morally accountable than his victims and similarly 
we could not conclude that Mother Teresa was more virtuous than was Adolf Hitler. 
The conclusion seems absurd, but, as outlined, it is borne from rather airtight logic in 
soundest approach to moral assessment. Indeed, reducing moral luck to its bare bones 
may render the pursuit of legitimate moral judgment a fool’s errand. 
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Many philosophers refuse to accept this disconcerting notion, attempting to poke 
holes at Nagel and Williams’ descriptions of moral luck. Brian Rosebury (1995) claims 
that both Nagel and Williams’ examples to illustrate the problem of moral luck are 
incomplete. He homes in on Williams’ classic example of Gauguin, the man who makes 
artist abroad in Tahiti (518). Rosebury argues that Williams focuses too much on the 
that what is moral in this case is not the consequences of the action but the agent’s 
deployment of knowledge and the degree of stringency with which Gauguin treats this 
potentially grave decision. He claims that a case like Gauguin’s demonstrates the idea 
that morality is not subject to the luck that one faces, but that moral choice is instead 
making a decision rather than the anticipation of blame or praise on moral grounds. 
Rosebury’s argument is admirable, but fails to consider the full scope of Nagel’s 
concept of moral luck. While intuitively it does seem that ignoring the consequential 
luck of Gauguin’s situation may settle the dilemma of moral luck, even a hypothetical 
where Gauguin painstakingly considers all degrees of pros and cons in making a 
perfectly utilitarian decision is subject to an astonishing magnitude of moral luck. The 
hypothetical Gauguin who is most aware of his fallibility and works to avoid any sort 
of decision-related negligence acts this way because of constitutive luck and perhaps a 
a good upbringing, etc. Therefore, Rosebury fails to explain how we can make moral 
judgments while ignoring moral luck, though he does touch on a compelling idea; it 
seems that constitutive luck and, to an extent, circumstantial luck, should be held to a 
moral luck. He also seems to make the mistake of ignoring constitutive luck, as many 
detractors of Nagel do. Hanna outlines the case of George and Georg, two assassins 
who intend to kill a target, with Georg failing to do so as a truck blocks his line of sight 
only to the extent that what we are assessed for depends on factors under our control 
the grounds that they’re not assessable for the same things, as one murdered someone 
and the other didn’t. Hanna then goes on to claim that though the lack of control of 
circumstances entails a lack of control over what options are available, it doesn’t entail 
a lack of control over which of these options Georg and George ultimately take. This 
Georg/George hypothetical (the presence or lack thereof of the truck), but there are 
here when making a moral judgment of the two assassins, an intention that is the same 
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for the two and thus would lead to the same moral judgment, and also it is clear, again, 
that even if we are accurately judging the intention, we are failing to recognize that the 
constitutive and circumstantial factors that led them to this dastardly intention were 
out of their control as well. Thus, Hanna fails to discredit circumstantial luck in this 
case as he claimed to. 
At this point, we are at much the same troubling crossroads where the unsettling 
conclusion of Nagel’s conception of moral luck remains unscathed. Nagel foresaw the 
is important to examine Williams’ notion of agent regret. Agent regret is a type of 
regret that can only be aimed toward one’s own actions, and involves the agent taking 
responsibility for the regretful act (1981, 29). Returning to the example of Gauguin, 
Williams suggests that the feeling of agent regret based upon retrospective attitudes of 
his failure can be deemed a moral act itself, and thus perhaps shows that factors out of 
the moral assessment of the decision (36). Nagel does not buy this explanation, and 
asserts that Williams fails to explain why these retrospective feelings can be deemed 
the agent cannot control. Rosebury echoes this contention, stating that agent regret 
exists only because one can never be sure that they are truly free of negligence in 
committing a regretful act, and thus there is no reason to believe that these moral luck-
agent regret and the moral status of this distinctive, luck-based emotion. 
Wolf is primarily concerned with investigating the phenomenon of consequential luck, 
one believes that equal recklessness deserves equal blame regardless of consequences 
in the negligent driver example, is incomplete. Before getting into the crux of her 
argument, she notes that it appears problematic to suggest that the human tendency 
emotions (6). Though in the abstract, the rationalist position seems quite appealing, if 
In a hypothetical, rationalist world where the driver who kills a child receives the same 
amount of moral blame as the equally negligent driver who kills no one, this would 
entail that the killer driver blames himself as much as the solely negligent driver blames 
himself. Though the driver who was simply negligent would be sad to learn that a child 
had died and perhaps attribute a level of blame to himself due to an acknowledgement 
of a slight negligence that could have led to the same result, this does not account for the 
the killer driver who is able to embody the rationalist position and assume the same 
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amount of self-blame as the purely negligent driver, feeling a twinge of grieving and 
regret at his small amount of negligence, but also able to distance himself from intense 
agent regret through realization of his unlikely degree of consequential luck. As Wolf 
notes, there is something rather disturbing about this fully rational driver’s detaching 
himself from the child’s death, despite how conceptually coherent this attitude may be 
immoral lack of agent regret.
It is this line of reasoning that brings Wolf to propose that adequately taking 
responsibility for one’s actions and the ensuing consequences in cases such as this, despite 
their being prone to consequential luck-based factors outside of the agent’s control, is 
reasoning for its being a virtue deserving of moral assessment. Wolf argues that this 
nameless virtue is akin to the virtue of generosity as its presence in those bestowed with 
accounting for this virtue, we can consistently be rationalists when it comes to levying 
it is true that this nameless virtue exists, then the strength of consequential luck is put 
this particular type of luck. 
However, many are skeptical that this nameless virtue can be branded thusly, and 
further doubt the morality of this type of emotion. As stated earlier, though Nagel 
does not directly respond to Wolf, he fails to endorse the view that such retrospectively-
that this allegedly-virtuous feeling of agent regret may not be moral as it is a byproduct 
of agents’ inevitable lack of certainty that it is ever solely consequential luck that causes 
their misdoings. These are valid criticisms, and I feel that Rosebury’s in particular 
is important to consider when discussing the nameless virtue. Even if an agent were 
to perfectly subscribe to the rationalist position, no one could ever be granted all 
the epistemological information necessary to be sure that their misfortune was 
governed purely by consequential luck. Still, something does seem perturbing about a 
hypothetical agent--certain that poor consequential luck is all that played a role in the 
the act. I believe the existence of this nameless virtue can be argued ad nauseam, and 
though no one can be certain of its existence, it does put into doubt consequential luck’s 
strength. A subcategory of moral luck such as constitutive luck, on the other hand, is 
not subject to such doubt. Taking the nameless virtue to be legitimate, those who aren’t 
endowed with it surely aren’t as a result of constitutive luck, and thus cannot be morally 
judged on the grounds of constitutive luck if we adhere to the control principle. This 
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based on antecedent circumstances is essentially a mixture of the former two types). 
Though Hanna attempted to demonstrate that one can adhere to the control principle 
seems that this belief has yet to be the least bit supported. 
We have again circled back to the same troubling starting point, albeit with a potential 
between constitutive and circumstantial luck). What are we to do with the troubling 
idea that, if we subscribe to the reasonable belief that people should not be morally 
judged for factors beyond their control, then we cannot make any moral judgments 
whatsoever? Perhaps we can rest easier knowing that the world can more hopefully 
approach order if we reject this logical conclusion in favor of a more practical and 
rational one that promotes judgments that resemble moral assessments even if they do 
not adhere to the control principle. In his postscript to his original article on moral 
luck, Williams pushes back against Nagel’s rebuttal, explaining that the case of Gauguin 
based on factors outside of that person’s control, we can propose the existence of a 
type of value, separate from moral value if we adhere to Nagel, that can allow us to 
avoid the damning implication of Nagel’s concept of moral luck. It would certainly be 
convenient, reasonable, and practical to do so, even if we do not semantically consider 
these judgments to be morally-driven assessments. 
In doing so, we can accept the insultingly reasonable assertion that Mother Teresa and 
Hitler are, indeed, not deserving of equal blame. Surely someone like Sophie Scholl 
deserves to be lauded for her heroism, while a man such as Adolf Eichmann deserves 
severe punishment, even when taking into account the strength of their respective 
environmental and constitutive factors. Though Eichmann can be held as morally 
accountable as a crimeless man living in present-day Germany who would have 
committed the same crimes in Eichmann’s circumstances, the latter person could not be 
held accountable for his constitution as his latent immorality would not have a chance 
to make itself apparent. Thus, the problem with adhering to moral luck and the control 
principle is that assuming such a position leads to practical disasters in the punitive 
and laudatory realms. If certain intentions or constitutions were similarly punished 
regardless of their consequences or circumstances, then punishment would become 
ubiquitous in society and nary a person could trust another. On the other hand, if 
we deviate from Nagel’s unsettling conclusion and endorse the non-moral value that 
Williams endorsed in his postscript, we will surely enjoy a healthier, more utilitarian 
society. 
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Concluding remarks
Indeed, the philosophical implications of Nagel’s paper are tremendously damaging 
to such sacred values as fair moral evaluation and human agency, but it is clear that 
we should not and do not have to (and imaginably could not) apply this disquieting 
philosophy to our lives and most precious values. As Roger Crisp (2017) outlines in his 
essay on moral luck and the equality of moral opportunity, rewarding actual successes 
agents to take greater care than they otherwise would to avoid bad outcomes, such as 
hold on humanity must be largely ignored if it is our aim to foster a world of order and 
goodness.
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